WHEN HMS Marlborough was released from military operations in the Gulf in early April, her programme was still unclear.

She had left the UK ostensibly on a peace-time task with a Royal Navy flotilla, but was sucked into the war against Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq. With the dust hardly settled, she was off again, flying the flag in the Far East as she reverted to a roving ambassador for the UK.

Marlborough had left her home port of Portsmouth on January 17 with the Duke of Marlborough embarked, flying his battle standard. At that point NTG 03 was still on the programme, but the signs were pointing towards a detour into the Northern Arabian Gulf – and so it proved.

The frigate was the last of four Task Group escorts to leave the UK, following destroyers HM ships Liverpool, Edinburgh and York, and she was hampered on her way south by poor weather – 45-knot winds and 8-metre confused swell adding up to an uncomfortable trip.

There was flooding in the 4.5in gunbay, caused by heavy seas damaging the seal around the gun barrel, so BAE Systems workers met the ship in Gibraltar to effect repairs, which were completed in just one day.

Marlborough then ploughed out into the stormy Mediterranean and passed the rest of the Task Group, her arrival at the Cyprus training grounds being heralded by a severe electrical storm and waterspouts.

A period of training followed, with Marlborough concentrating on ship boarding techniques, reflecting her likely role in the Gulf.

After a visit by Commander-in-Chief Fleet Admiral Sir Jonathon Band, the main body of the Amphibious Task Group (ATG) passed through the Suez Canal, with Marlborough following shortly after in company with supply ship RFA Fort Austin.

Emerging from the Red Sea, the ship went to full Defence Watches on February 9 and remained in that state almost without break for around two months. Her diving team flew out to a Gulf port to provide jetty clearance for RFA Argus, while the frigate headed on to the Strait of Hormuz with Fort Austin and RFA Fort Victoria.

A period of intense training ensued while Marlborough waited for specific instructions, but on February 18 she moved north to join HM ships Cardiff and Chatham and prepare for ‘contingent operations’.

Boarding operations commenced the following day, under the control of HMAS Darwin, though Marlborough returned to the vicinity of Bahrain late the following day to pick up stores and mail for all three RN ships.

Cardiff was withdrawn soon after to return to the UK, and with Chatham standing down for a port visit, this left Marlborough leading the UK maritime interdiction operations (MIOPs).

Her job was to stop illegal shipments of cargo into and out of Iraq – not easy as fishing and cargo dhows and small steel-hulled general purpose freighters were scattered across the patrol area near Iraq’s two offshore oil terminals, known as MABOT and KAAOT, the majority carrying on a perfectly legitimate trade.

Boardings were generally carried out at night, as this is when the smugglers tended to leave the Iraqi coast undetected or in a rush to try to overwhelm Coalition ships.

Sea states could suddenly change from calm with light winds to choppy with 25-knot winds – and on one occasion a sandstorm reduced visibility to 50 metres while the boarding boats were out. They made it back safely to the ship using the recently-introduced hand-held satellite navigation system.

Planning for Operation Telic was well under way, and there was a sense of rising tension – Marlborough had to be aware of the risk of a pre-emptive missile strike or a terrorist attack by small boat. She also helped build up a pattern of activity in the mouth of the Khawr Abd Allah (KAA), including Iraqi patrol boat and tug movements.

The plan was that when the coast and hinterland had been secured by land forces, the KAA would first be cleared of traffic then cleared for danger, allowing humanitarian ships into Umm Qasr.

In order to help the land offensive, the Commanding Officer and senior officers from HMS Marlborough were invited to Royal Marines Commando briefings on board HMS Ocean, as the frigate had been asked to provide naval gunfire support (NGS) to 40 and 42 Cdo in the initial assault on the Al Faw peninsula.

Capt Mark Anderson, the Commanding Officer of HMS Marlborough, provided a comprehensive report on the benefits and dangers of his proposed NGS formation for American Admiral Costello, then the ship began final preparations for conflict.

She rafted up to forward repair ship RFA Diligence in international waters north of Bahrain, with various maintenance and upgrade work being carried out over four days, before the frigate headed north again to greet and help acclimatise sister ship HMS Richmond, the designated Armilla Patrol frigate.

Marlborough also formed a close working relationship with 160-ton American Coast Guard patrol ship Adak – a versatile 110-foot Island-class ship with a speed of 32 knots and a draft of just two metres.

On March 14, with Saddam’s March 17 deadline approaching fast, Marlborough moved back into the ‘front line’, spending most of the time fully closed down to gas-tight ‘Condition Alpha’, with personnel carrying protection equipment and dressed in fire-resistant overalls.

Mass break-outs of dhows from the KAA continued, but few got through the Coalition, Kuwaiti or Iranian forces policing their own areas of concern.

During March 15, Marlborough observed and reported on suspicious activity between an Iraqi PB90 patrol boat, a Type 15 patrol craft and tugs near the oil terminals. At one point the PB90 trained its weapons on US Coast Guard Cutter Wrangler, emphasising the need to keep these activities under close scrutiny.

Dhow traffic faded away fast at this stage, and at the end of a very quiet day on March 17, 38 dhows were spotted leaving the KAA under white flags by HMAS Darwin’s boats and Marlborough’s Lynx helicopter.

The lead dhow stated that Iraqi forces had forced them out at gunpoint, and these ships were sent to a clearing area, searched and released; at this point MIOPs were suspended as safe clearance of the KAA became the priority.

It became clear the Iraqi expected an immediate assault, so safety distances for Coalition aircraft were increased and it was assumed that the MABOT and KAAOT terminals would be manned by Iraqi military personnel intent on sabotage.

As Scene of Action Commander Marlborough kept the approaches to the KAA under constant surveillance, though a convoy of 35 steel-hulled merchant ships, many known oil smugglers, meant a busy time for the British frigate as she helped search and redirect them – they again had been directed to leave by the Iraqi military.

Initial cruise missile firings from American ships in Marlborough’s sector were not seen because of poor visibility, but there was a brief confrontation.

A Type 54 Iraqi patrol boat was intercepted by the frigate’s Lynx helicopter, and five uniformed personnel seen on board, but no weapons were displayed and the boat turned north and made 32 knots.

As it offered no threat to Coalition forces, and a confrontation in advance of planned engagement was to be avoided, the Lynx was instructed to shepherd the boat up the river.

That afternoon the ship stood back from the front line for a brief break, and the first Scud missiles were fired by Iraq into Kuwait. That evening, march 20, Marlborough received confirmation that the naval gunfire support mission would go ahead.

Part 2: On the gunline